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Title VIII and Mount Laurel:
Is Affordable Housing Fair Housing?
John M. Payne*
Like many landmark accomplishments, Title VIII of the 1968 Civil
Rights Act' has spawned a level of indirect activity whose benefits
greatly expand the reach of the fair housing movement. Title VIII
did not invent the idea of fair housing, but it certainly brought that
idea to the forefront of our social conscience and stimulated atten-
tion to a much broader range of fair housing issues. I report here
on one of these secondary effects of Title VIII, the Mount Laurel
movement in New Jersey.
The Mount Laurel decisions2 seek to retard economic segregation
by holding that state constitutional general welfare limitations re-
quire a municipality's land-use regulations to provide for the munic-
ipality's fair share of the regional need for low- and moderate-
income housing. As implemented in the widely discussed Mount
Laurel II decision, the doctrine requires municipalities to take affirm-
ative measures to encourage the availability of low- and moderate-
income housing, although the court has thus far stopped short of
requiring that municipalities actually produce the housing
themselves.
Civil rights organizations brought the Mount Laurel cases under
the banner of fair housing. The first plaintiff was the NAACP of
Southern Burlington County, and it was followed by other plaintiffs
from the civil rights community, notably the Urban Leagues of Es-
sex (Newark) and Middlesex Counties (New Brunswick). 3 Before
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plaintiffs in Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor and Council of Carteret.
Prepared for Yale Law & Policy Review conference, The Fair Housing Act After Twenty Years
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982).
2. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.
1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel 1]; S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel II]; Hills Dev. v. Township of
Bernards, 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986) [hereinafter Mount Laurel III]. The term Mount
Laurel is used throughout this paper to describe circumstances surrounding these cases,
in addition to referring to the decisions.
3. See Urban League of Essex County v. Township of Mahwah, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J.
1983) (decided as part of Mount Laurel I); Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v.
Mayor and Council of Carteret, 359 A.2d 526 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), rev'd, 406
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being transformed by state constitutional law theories, the Mount
Laurel cases were federal civil rights cases. The trial court decision
in Mount Laurel I rested on the fourteenth amendment, 4 and the Ur-
ban League suit used a Title VIII theory in addition to its state
"general welfare" claims. 5 Federal claims, both constitutional and
statutory, became an impediment after Mount Laurel I because they
kept open the possibility of certiorari review in an unfriendly United
States Supreme Court. Newer cases have therefore brought only
state law claims, and the link to Title VIII is no longer apparent.
I seek here to restore that link. After briefly setting the stage with
a description of how Mount Laurel H compliance has worked, I want
to explore whether affordable housing is, in fact, fair housing; that
is, is it good for the communities of people that Title VIII seeks to
protect?
L How Mount Laurel Works
The mechanics of calculating a municipality's fair share obligation
are interesting, but not of primary importance for present pur-
poses. 6 What counts is how the need, once allocated to municipali-
ties, is met.
A.2d 1322 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (decided as
Mount Laurel II). The Mahwah case involved a community whose largest taxpayer was a
major Ford assembly plant, but whose land-use practices made it impossible for the
Ford workers to live there. The Carteret case was a county-wide suit (Middlesex County)
in the fast-growing central New Jersey region between New Brunswick and Princeton.
Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent reference to the Urban League suit indicates the
Carteret-Middlesex County matter.
4. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 290 A.2d 465, 469
(NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
5. 406 A.2d 1322 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (Title VIII claim stated by plain-
tiffs); see also Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Township of Cranbury, 536
A.2d 287, 299 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (plaintiffs may recover attorneys' fees on
Title VIII claim, even though no court decision on merits of this claim).
6. However, some aspects of the methodology currently imposed by the Council on
Affordable Housing, to be described below, may actually violate Title VIII. The meth-
odology reallocates housing need from communities that have excessive numbers of
poor families to developing communities that have the strong housing markets capable
of supporting inclusionary lower-income housing developments. See generally N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 52:27D-312 (West 1986); N.J. Admin. Code tit. 5 § 92 (1986). Under the law,
however, reallocation takes place only within "housing regions," and the Council has
drawn them so as to frustrate the effectiveness of the reallocation process. The poorest
(and most heavily minority) area of the state, Jersey City, has been placed in a region
which has very few developing municipalities to aid it. The most rapidly developing part
of the state, mostly white Middlesex and Somerset Counties, has been placed in a region
which has only two small urban centers with excess housing need, so that municipalities
in these counties have fair shares well below what they could absorb. These regions
have a racially disparate impact which arguably violates Title VIII. See Payne, Rethinking




The typical suburban Mount Laurel development is usually a
townhouse-style, multi-family project with between 250 and 1500
units, of which 20% are "set aside" for low- and moderate-income
households. 7 The project is built at densities ranging from six to
twelve units per acre and is sold in condominium form. Because
rental projects are currently difficult to achieve through the private
market, the state now offers a "bonus" for towns that meet part of
their fair share in rental form.8 The land on which development
occurs typically had previously been zoned for less intensive resi-
dential use, usually three units per acre or less, or was in a "holding
zone" that did not permit residential use at all. 9
Mount Laurel is simply the privatization of the national housing
policy of the 1960s and 1970s. It harnesses private development
activity and diverts some of the profit of intensive development to
money-losing, price- or rent-controlled units for lower-income fami-
lies. Mount Laurel may sound like alchemy, but there is little mys-
tery to the source of the subsidy for the lower-income units, which
averages about $25,000 per unit.
The subsidy comes, first, from the higher densities which are gen-
erally allowed as a tradeoff for building the lower-income Mount
Laurel component. Higher densities use the land more efficiently
and permit more efficient building techniques. So long as the below
market Mount Laurel component is included to drain off some of
the profit that results from the efficiency gains, the surplus is not
simply capitalized into higher land costs that would defeat the
Mount Laurel technique. The only Way that the municipality can
"create" this surplus, however, is to allow more intensive develop-
ment of its land area than it had previously allowed. Intensive de-
velopment, in turn, brings to the municipality a whole host of
related social costs, the most obvious of which is the cost of new
infrastructure for a denser population. The Mount Laurel subsidy is
7. The mechanisms for pricing the below market units and for qualifying the occu-
pants is also complex. In general, Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) standards for the Section 8 program are applied. See N.J. Admin. Code tit. 5
§ 92-12.4 (1986).
8. Rental units count as 1.33 units when credited toward the municipality's fair share
obligation, thus reducing the net number of units for which the municipality must pro-
vide. See NJ. Admin. Code tit. 92 § 5:92-14.4 (1986). Rental units are more readily
available to poor households because no down payment is required and expensive main-
tenance obligations that accompany homeowning are reduced.
9. These are "typical" developments. Some are atypical, such as a 60-unit project in
South Brunswick that will contain only 12 Mount Laurel units and a projected new town
in Old Bridge that was to contain 1,668 Mount Laurel units out of some 16,380 total
units.
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therefore not cost-free, and it is important in Mount Laurel plan-
ning to try to direct growth to communities where growth is inde-
pendently justifiable. 10
A second source of the Mount Laurel subsidy comes from the
marketplace. It is simplistic to flatly conclude that the purchasers of
market rate units are "subsidizing" the below market purchasers.
The timing of Mount Laurel H was felicitous, coming just as the hous-
ing depression of the 1970s ended and the market began to react to
pent-up demand. That demand, and a booming economy, make it
possible in New Jersey to sell anything that has four walls and a roof.
In such a market it is not clear whether a developer freed of the
subsidized Mount Laurel units would necessarily reduce prices on
the market units. Demand may be strong enough so that some or all
of the Mount Laurel subsidy could be retained as profit.
These market conditions provide some basis for the New Jersey
Supreme Court's assertion that subsidies from other purchasers or
tenants are not involved, and that it is the developer's choice
whether to forego some of its profit in order to gain the right to
build in this style and density." An offer to build Mount Laurel
units is a weapon for these developers; absent this offer the munici-
pality would probably be free under conventional zoning law to
zone for lower densities and keep the developer out altogether.
This perspective also suggests that if the market rate units do in-
crease in price because of the Mount Laurel subsidy, it is the cost
these households pay to "purchase" access to a community that
would otherwise not allow the type of housing they want.' 2 This
analysis also suggests one reason why Mount Laurel has not trav-
elled very well beyond New Jersey. Where demand is lower and land
is plentiful, generously zoned, and relatively cheap, developers do
not need the Mount Laurel weapon, for there is a further frontier
where housing can be built without these incentives.' 3
10. This was the philosophy behind the use of the State Development Guide Plan as
a measure of where growth should occur in Mount Laurel II. For a different approach,
which places somewhat less faith in abstract planning, see Payne, supra note 6.
11. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 446 n.30.
12. It might be argued that the Mount Laurel process piles regulation on top of
regulation in a market which would function best if free of regulation altogether. See
Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1167 (1981). In any
realistic time frame, however, land-use regulation is a given and, in this sense, the
Mount Laurel process corrects for distortions that conventional zoning allows.
13. This, however, does not excuse the New York Court of Appeals' rejection of the
Mount Laurel process as applied to the Long Island subregion of the New York metro-
politan area, where land is neither plentiful, generously zoned, nor cheap. See Suffolk




The major components of the Mount Laurel alchemy come from
increased densities, which add burdens to the municipalities, and
from market factors, borne in part by developers and in part by mar-
ket-rate households. A third source of savings is the elimination of
cost-generating requirements in the building code. The list of such
requirements is endless: dedicated open space requirements, ex-
pensive facade treatments, excessive parking space requirements,
inefficient plumbing and other code standards, unnecessary studies,
impact statements and application fees, and even, in one of the Ur-
ban League cases, a ratio of required swimming pools to housing
units.
Municipalities give up these cost generators fairly readily when
faced with litigation, and while this undoubtedly helps to contain
costs, I know of no project where elimination of cost generators
alone has been sufficient to induce developer participation in a
Mount Laurel proposal.1 4 Unlike the other sources of subsidy, re-
moval of cost generators does not involve a shift of a real cost from
one party to another so much as elimination of an arbitrary and arti-
ficial cost.
15
A final category of subsidy is direct public assistance to reduce the
cost of a project. The Mount Laurel decisions have made it clear
that a municipality's affirmative obligation stops short of building
the housing itself, but a municipality can often be induced to con-
tribute in order to have the compliance plan structured the way it
desires. 16 Before the Tax Reform Act, 1 7 tax shelters offered good
potential for reducing costs so that a higher percentage of a devel-
opment could be Mount Laurel. Use of nonprofit developers, cre-
ated initially by the municipality, can still be an effective way of
reducing costs.
The biggest source of municipal subsidy, however, remains public
land. Many municipalities hold vacant or developable land, mostly
14. There is some irony in this, since elimination of cost generators was a principal
focus of the early suits and of Mount Laurel I.
15. Also in the "cost generator" category are restrictions on manufactured and mod-
ular (formerly called mobile) homes. Flat prohibitions are now illegal in NewJersey, but
there has been no rush to build in this format. See Mount Laurel I1, 456 A.2d at 450;
Robinson Township v. Knoll, 302 N.W.2d 146 (Mich. 1981).
16. Usually to avoid excessive use of the standard 20% inclusionary development
which requires four market units for each Mount Laurel one, an obviously profligate use
of development resources if other ways are possible. See Payne, supra note 6, at 27.
Direct subsidization has its downside, however, when it is used primarily for rehabilita-
tion of owner-occupied housing. See infra note 27.
17. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as IRC
(1986)).
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as surplus property or as lots acquired through tax foreclosure. Do-
nation of this land, particularly if combined creatively with other
techniques such as nonprofit sponsorship and use of manufactured
housing components, can achieve spectacular savings. A Princeton
project now in progress, for example, uses these three techniques in
combination to produce a development that is 50% market rate
housing and 50% Mount Laurel housing, thus preserving a substan-
tial element of economic mixing in a community where housing
costs are very high.
18
This overview cannot do justice to the complexity of making
Mount Laurel work. However, there can be no doubt about one
thing. For better or for worse, Mount Laurel is working in New
Jersey. After January 1983, when Mount Laurel II was announced,
well over 100 developer-plaintiff suits were filed, 19 leading to such
absurd situations as 11 developers competing for the privilege of
subsidizing several hundred fair share units in Warren Township.
20
However academics or activists feel about it, developers think that
Mount Laurel is good business and have not hesitated to take advan-
tage of it.
II. Evaluating Mount Laurel
The central criticism of Mount Laurel in the fair housing commu-
nity is the assertion that the litigation has not done any good for
black or other minority households, and that Mount Laurel is for the
marginal middle class of the suburbs, which past racial discrimina-
tion has left predominantly white. 2' To the extent that persons of
18. There is also some direct subsidy money available from the state, appropriated
as par"t of the New Jersey Fair Housing Act of 1985, NJ. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-321 (West
1986), and some vestigial federal funds from the Section Eight and Farm Home Loan
programs. In general, however, these subsidies are best used to leverage other Mount
Laurel techniques. At an average $25,000 per unit subsidy, a one million dollar appro-
priation produces only 40 units, in a state where need is estimated at 140,000-240,000
units. See Payne, supra note 6, at 30.
A troubling phenomenon which has developed recently centers on the Regional Con-
tribution Agreements, to be described more fully below. See infra text accompanying
notes 43-44. Some municipalities are raising money by bonding, rather than from
Mount Laurel-related development activities, in order to cash out their obligation and
build the units elsewhere. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-312 (West 1986); N.J. Admin.
Code tit. 5 § 92-11 (1986). This probably shifts more of the Mount Laurel burden di-
rectly to the community than is desirable and, as a result, is not very good politics.
19. See Mallach, The Tortured Reality of Suburban Exclusion: Zoning, Economics
and the Future of the Berensen Decision, 4 Pace Env. L. Rev. 37, 119 (1986).
20. J.W. Field Co. v. Township of Franklin, 499 A.2d 251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1985).
21. See, e.g., Holmes, A Black Perspective on Mount Laurel II: Towards a Black "Fair




color are advantaged, it is said that the beneficiaries will be the mar-
ginal middle class black households still in the cities, thus accelerat-
ing their flight from the cities and leaving the cities even more the
repository of the poorest of the minority poor.
This criticism should be taken seriously. In their conventional ap-
plication in "inclusionary developments" in the suburbs, Mount
Laurel housing units are mostly for sale in condominium develop-
ments, rather than being offered for rent, and require an income of
between $14,500 and $29,000.22 Without especially creative en-
deavors, Mount Laurel units cannot be priced so that they benefit
households earning less than about 40% of the regional median in-
come; even with such creative endeavors 23 it is clear that the poorest
of the poor cannot be served. Such is the cost of a program that, as
noted above, is essentially a form of privatization.
The statistics lend some support to the criticisms. Reliable hard
data are still hard to come by, because there is no central collection
mechanism for Mount Laurel activities. By best estimates, however,
there are about 1,900 Mount Laurel units constructed and occupied
in the state as of early 1988.24 Alan Mallach, a leading Mount Lau-
22. See supra note 8 on the importance of the sales/rental difference. The Council on
Affordable Housing estimates median income at approximately $36,000 for a family of
four, adjusted upwards and downwards for different sized households. 2 COAH News-
letter, No.3, at 5 (1987). To make the units affordable to households not at the very top
of the eligibility range, the monthly cost (30% of income) is usually calculated on a
household at 45% of median for low and 65% of median for moderate. This results in
monthly shelter costs of about $400 to $600 per month. Sales prices currently range
from just under $30,000 to the mid-$50,000 range.
23. See supra text accompanying note 18.
24. A study is currently underway, sponsored by the Fund For New Jersey and car-
ried out by the Alliance for Affordable Housing Education Fund, with a formal report
expected later in 1988. The estimate in the text was supplied to the author by Alan
Mallach on March 17, 1988, based on preliminary results of the Alliance for Affordable
Housing study.
Less than 2,000 units may seem paltry as the product of 15 years of litigation. Until
Mount Laurel IH in 1983, however, there was no effective enforcement mechanism at all,
and in 1985, just as the fruits of Mount Laurel II began to appear, the adoption of the
(New Jersey) Fair Housing Act, NJ. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-301 et seq., and the transfer of
all active cases to the newly created Council on Affordable Housing (COAH) (see Mount
Laurel Ii, 510 A.2d 621) put everything on hold again. COAH certified its first housing
units in May 1987, and by the end of 1987 had approved plans for 4,000 additional
units.
COAH estimated that applications pending before it would produce an additional
18,000 units by 1993, and it had speculative plans for an additional 14,000 units. In
addition, there are several thousand more units that are or will be provided through
court settlements and adjudications separate from the COAH process. The most opti-
mistic total projection is for 37,642 Mount Laurel units by 1993, but many of these will
be rehabs rather than new construction. An inclusionary development at 20% requires
four market rate units for each Mount Laurel unit; to produce 25,000 new Mount Laurel
units through 1993 would require a total of 125,000 new units of residential construc-
tion. At best, New Jersey has averaged 50,000 new units per year, which means that
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rel planner, has undertaken an occupational profile of the Village
Green condominiums, the Mount Laurel component of The Hills of
Bedminster, the first Mount Laurel project to be built and occupied
after 1983.
Mallach found that 60%-70% of the Mount Laurel units were oc-
cupied by blue-collar wage earners or their female, "pink-collar"
counterparts, with less than 25% classified as professionals. The
professionals, moreover, were generally teachers. There were no
"high status" professionals such as lawyers or doctors. Similarly,
those occupants classified as "managers" tended to be in low-pay-
ing, low-advancement positions rather than being on the first rung
of a lucrative corporate ladder. Most significantly, Mallach found
that 25% of the households, and one-third of the households quali-
fying for multi-bedroom units, were female-headed households with
dependent children. Although not reported by Mallach, other anec-
dotal information confirms that there is some degree of racial inte-
gration as well.2 5 It also appears that a large proportion of the
residents previously resided in the suburbs, rather than moving
from an urban center.
These data and informal reports give mixed comfort. To the ex-
tent that Village Green proves typical, Mount Laurel developments
are economically integrated and do not appear to be enclaves of
yuppies.26 However, the majority of beneficiaries are white, which is
to be expected whenever poverty rather than race itself is used as
the qualifying variable. It is also quite clear that, to date, the Mount
Laurel developments are not emptying the cities, which may be
either good or bad depending on one's view of what Mount Laurel
was supposed to accomplish.
The sample is very small, however, and the big question is what
will happen to the demographics once large numbers of units be-
come available. One lesson that Mount Laurel has taught us is that
there is a tremendous pool of suburban poverty, one undoubtedly
much larger than the count of low- and moderate-income house-
almost one out of three new construction projects would have to have a Mount Laurel
component. This is an extremely ambitious goal, although not patently unobtainable,
and it still falls short of the lowest, politically motivated estimate of need, that of the
COAH.
25. The author has discussed this point, for instance, with C. Roy Epps, President of
the Civic League of Greater New Brunswick, plaintiff in the Urban League suit. Epps
maintains close watch on affordable housing developments in central New Jersey.
26. For an anecdotal profile, see The Hills Are Alive, Sunday Star-Ledger (Newark),




holds used in the Mount Laurel fair share formulas.2 7 Absent special
emphasis on recruitment of minority households, the suburban,
white makeup of the developments will persist.28
Even with special emphasis on minority recruitment, it may be
questioned how much movement of minority households from the
cities could realistically have been expected when Mount Laurel I was
brought. I have a vivid recollection of reporting on our Urban
League case to a general meeting of the Urban League at a neigh-
borhood center in a black area of New Brunswick. When I described
a recent legal triumph in the Township of Plainsboro, some ten
miles south of New Brunswick and five miles east of Princeton, in
the heart of the richest employment market in New Jersey, I was
hooted down by those for whom I ostensibly worked. Plainsboro, a
farming-turned-yuppie town, totally dependent on the automobile
for transportation, and with no network of social support for the
urban black family, might just as well have been on Mars as far as my
listeners were concerned.
In attempting to be dispassionate and academic, I must concede
that Mount Laurel does not, as of March 1988, stand as a completed
triumph of the civil rights movement. One cannot give five years of
intensive labor to litigation such as this, however, and remain totally
dispassionate.2 9 I believe that Mount Laurel is, if not a triumph of
27. The formulas use surrogates for need based on census data about substandard
physical housing conditions. See AMG Realty Company v. Township of Warren, 504
A.2d 692 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); Rice, Exclusionary Zoning: Mount Laurel in
New York, 6 Pace L. Rev. 135 (1986). Neither the courts nor COAH have included in
their counts what is called "financial need," that is, households living in standard hous-
ing but paying more than 30% of household income for it. It has been estimated that
inclusion of this group would double the need estimates. See Payne, supra note 6, at 25.
Housing advocates have not pressed this issue vigorously, because even the lower esti-
mates are well beyond the capacity of the private market to supply using the now-con-
ventional 20% set-aside technique. This category may become more relevant, however,
if and when public subsidy programs are revived so that 100% lower-income develop-
ments are once again feasible, as was true when the first Mount Laurel cases were
brought. One adverse consequence of the emphasis on physical condition is that COAH
has been very generous in approving housing elements that meet the municipality's fair
share through rehabilitation of existing occupied housing. By definition, this approach
restricts access to the community by non-residents, including minority residents from
the urban core.
28. All Mount Laurel protocols contain non-discrimination provisions and affirma-
tive marketing requirements. There is potential for a greatly expanded role for private
fair housing agencies in assisting in this marketing. So far as I am aware, no one has
suggested imposing specific racial quotas in Mount Laurel developments. Cf U.S. v.
Starrett City Assocs., 660 F. Supp. 668 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.
1988).
29. Should the reader, moreover, favor the printed version of these remarks by cit-
ing them in some other place, I will deem it sporting to balance any reference to the
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the civil rights movement, nonetheless a small step in a civil rights
war that has been measured mostly in small steps for 125 years.
III. Is Affordable Housing Fair Housing?
First and foremost, Mount Laurel is a worthy pursuit because pov-
erty is a civil rights issue.30 Lawyers tend to forget this, since pov-
erty was stricken from the fourteenth amendment agenda of the civil
rights movement in the early 1970s by the United States Supreme
Court.3 ' Discrimination on the basis of poverty is particularly perni-
cious in the context of municipal zoning, not just because it is offi-
cial discrimination, but because municipal land-use decisions
burden the non-resident poor who have no say in making those de-
cisions. From this perspective, exclusionary zoning might be de-
scribed as a voting rights problem.
3 2
Discrimination in any form coarsens and weakens society. As a
result of Brown v. Board of Education,33 and its progeny, most overt
official discrimination has been ended in our generation. Conse-
quently, the focus of Title VIII has been on eradicating the more
subtle and pervasive problem of private housing discrimination. It
is therefore remarkable and dangerous to tolerate the overt official
discrimination against the poor currently practiced by many subur-
ban municipalities.
3 4
Racial discrimination is not far below the surface of economic dis-
crimination. Our society simply would not tolerate the amount of
poverty found in black and other minority communities if whites
were proportionally as poor as these less-favored groups. Racial
negative conclusions just drawn with appropriate acknowledgement of the more positive
comments to follow.
30. Discrimination on the basis of economic status is different from recognition of
legitimate economic limitations. Finding an appropriate line between these two con-
cepts is subtle and tricky and beyond the scope of this paper. One of the classics is
Michelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1969). Suffice it to say that Mount Laurel requires only a "realistic"
opportunity for housing, an opportunity limited by what a municipality can accomplish
through regulatory means. Some of the more visionary applications of the Mount Laurel
principle to the problems of the hard-core poor will be noted briefly below.
31. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973).
32. See Payne, Delegation Doctrine in the Reform of Local Government Law: The
Case of Exclusionary Zoning, 29 Rutgers L. Rev. 803 (1976).
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34. It also bears noting that housing discrimination has increasingly come to be seen
as a gender issue, as is exemplified by the proportion of female-headed households
claiming the first batch of Mount Laurel units. Mount Laurel I was not planned as a "wo-
men's case," but it spins off useful subsidiary consequences such as this, which indicate




fears undoubtedly reinforce and deepen the indifference to eco-
nomic misery that our society tolerates.
Thus, in negotiating settlements of Mount Laurel cases, the most
difficult point on which to reach agreement has frequently been
whether to allow local residents, most of whom are white, a waiting
list priority in applying for Mount Laurel units. Municipalities know
that they cannot overtly discriminate on the basis of race, but they
also fear an influx of minorities from the central cities. Residency
restrictions are an excellent surrogate for racial exclusions and they
have proven difficult to eradicate.
The case for pursuing Mount Laurel claims is a defensible one,
both because economic discrimination is wrong on its own terms
and because it is a transparent substitute for racial discrimination in
all too many cases. But the hard-core poor are still not helped by
the doctrine. Is Mount Laurel only for the marginal middle class
and therefore not an appropriate investment of social capital?
3 5
As noted previously, with creativity and good will, the reach of
Mount Laurel housing can-be extended to lower levels than is now
common, thus softening the edges of the criticism.3 6 Admittedly,
Mount Laurel is not capable of directly solving the problem of the
homeless, for whom an absolute inability to pay is the central truth.
But, indirectly, Mount Laurel is legally and politically important
even in these cases-sufficiently important that I feel confident in
rejecting the "middle class" accusation.
New Jersey's treatment of the homeless is now under litigation on
a variety of fronts. An important legal starting point has been the
Mount Laurel doctrine, from which public interest litigants have ar-
gued that a constitutional right to housing exists in New Jersey. No
court has squarely accepted the argument, but the decisions have
moved forcefully in the direction of greater statutory protection for
the homeless and have taken note that by doing so the constitutional
dimensions of the problem need not be resolved.
3 7
Similarly, the city ofJersey City is now in court defending an ordi-
nance that imposes sales price controls on condominium conver-
35. Is it a proper criticism of Title VIII generally that enforcement of its anti-dis-
crimination provisions most often benefits minorities of at least adequate means? See,
e.g., Irizarry v. 120 West 70th Owners Corporation, (S.D.N.Y. 1986) Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending Rep. (P-H) 15,551 (Sept. 1, 1986). Housing for the very poor is usually of-
fered on an equal opportunity basis, see Mallach, supra note 19, at 104, because race and
poverty are sufficiently correlated that landlords cannot afford the luxury of
discrimination.
36. See supra text accompanying note 18.
37. See Rodgers v. Gibson, 528 A.2d 43, 45 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
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sions in an effort to stem the tide of gentrification. By limiting
conversion prices to the capitalized value of legally controlled rents,
rent control avoidance will be eliminated as a motivation for conver-
sion and many low-priced units will remain in the city's housing
stock.38 Gentrification of the previously grim cities along the Hud-
son waterfront is rapidly eliminating this housing, much of it occu-
pied by families well below the defacto 40% floor found in suburban
Mount Laurel projects. The American Civil Liberties Union of New
Jersey has recently filed an extensive brief in support of the sales
control ordinance, again arguing that Mount Laurel supports, if not
compels, such regulatory activity.
3 9
Just as Brown led to many unanticipated developments beyond ra-
cially segregated schools, Mount Laurel is changing the legal and
constitutional environment in which housing issues are perceived.
Like Brown, which set in motion the events that led to the Fair Hous-
ing Act of 1968, Mount Laurel has altered the political landscape in
New Jersey. One of the functions of an activist decision is to break
political stalemate on rights issues. Brown did this. Baker v. Carr
40
did it with voting rights. In NewJersey, Robinson v. Cahill4 1 broke a
political stalemate with respect to education finance, and Mount Lau-
rel I and Mount Laurel II did it with exclusionary zoning. When an
effective remedy for implementing the Mount Laurel doctrine was
finally furnished by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1983, the
political pressure on the legislature became intolerable. In 1985, it
enacted a flawed but nonetheless far-reaching statutory program for
determining and enforcing "fair share" goals throughout the
state. 4
2
38. In an improvement on traditional rent control, moreover, occupancy controls
will be imposed, so that the true beneficiaries of the ordinance will be lower-income
households.
39. Committee for Housing Alternatives v. Mayor and City Council of Jersey City,
Docket No. A-1586-87T8 (appeal pending in N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., filed Mar. 14,
1988).
The Mount Laurel theory may also help in efforts by legal services attorneys to pro-
hibit the City of Newark from demolishing 1950s-style public housing projects, where
the land is to be redeveloped with middle-class townhouses. See letters of Harris David
and Melville D. Miller, Legal Services of New Jersey, to Marvin Krotenberg, Regional
Environmental Officer, HUD (Jan. 9, 1988) (emphasizing need for affordable housing in
Newark).
40. 369 U.S. 186 (1982).
41. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
42. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-301 e seq. (West 1986); see Mount Laurel III (act is facially
constitutional and justifies judicial withdrawal from the field until it is implemented). See
Franzese, Mount Laurel III: The New Jersey Supreme Court's Judicious Retreat, 18




The New Jersey Fair Housing Act of 1985 is not concerned solely
with suburban exclusion. As a result of the predictably byzantine
negotiations which produced the act, one of its principal features
provides for "regional contribution agreements," or RCAs, which
permit a municipality to finance up to half its fair share obligation in
another municipality. 43 The intended effect, borne out by the first
RCAs approved by the state, is to link the economic strength of the
suburbs to the financial need of the cities. Normally, this is accom-
plished by requiring developers to make a payment in lieu of con-
structing actual Mount Laurel units in their developments, which
then funds the urban units. Because the RCAs involve cash trans-
fers, instead of actual housing units, the receiving municipalities
have more flexibility in determining how to serve housing needs.
For instance, the money can be used to fund rent supplements in
existing housing for households whose incomes are too low to take
advantage of conventional Mount Laurel units.
44
The RCAs are controversial because they divide those who favor
an urban strategy for empowering minorities from those, perhaps
more visionary, who seek to hasten the genuine integration of the
suburbs. The RCAs play uncomfortably to a sense that white
America can buy racial and economic exclusion, not just in the mar-
ketplace of realpolitik but with the official sanction of state law. For
better or worse, however, the creation of RCAs demonstrates clearly
that Mount Laurel's reach is long, and that its potential extends well
beyond the marginal middle class and suburbia.
The political issue is also broader than specifics such as regional
contribution agreements and urban policy. The civil rights move-
ment is about empowerment, and that is where the Mount Laurel
doctrine is heading in New Jersey. The cases, and now the statute,
have forced housing policy into the public consciousness and onto
the public agenda. A statewide coalition, the Alliance for Affordable
Housing, has brought together labor and industry, landlords and
tenants, civil rights activists, clergy, and developers into an effective
lobbying force that stopped a constitutional amendment to repeal
Mount Laurel and has now begun to advance a positive agenda of
change in housing policy. Two recent statewide polls revealed
broad public concern about affordable housing and surprisingly
broad public acceptance of the Mount Laurel decisions and of the
state's role in supervising local land-use decisions that affect afford-
43. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-312 (West 1986).
44. See supra notes 8 and 22.
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able housing. 45 Politicians are gingerly beginning to court the hous-
ing vote, a dramatic change from a few years ago when space on the
anti-Mount Laurel bandwagon was standing room only.
We may not be close to the housing equivalent of Jesse Jackson
running effectively for president, but we are also not very far into
the Mount Laurel era. Ten years after Brown, it will be recalled, Vir-
ginia was still engaged in massive resistance. 46 The lasting achieve-
ment of Brown, I believe, was not desegregated schools, but the
stimulus it provided to a public discourse about equality, a discourse
that in time produced the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 47 1965,48 and
1968. 49 In its more modest compass, Mount Laurel, I submit, is
having and will continue to have a similar effect in New Jersey. It
has made working politicians think more closely not only about
housing, but about jobs, transportation, and education as they relate
to housing. It has, in short, changed the nature of the discourse and
has made it impossible not to think about economic discrimination
as a social problem. While the technical details are engaging, it is
the effect on the public discourse-and in time, I am confident, on
public policy as well-that makes Mount Laurel important.
45. See Star-Ledger (Newark), Jan. 7, 1988, at 34.
46. See Griffin v. Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) et seq. (1982).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (1982).
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982).
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